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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FUL TO 
ST ATE OF GEORGIA 





otM1¥7 - 200B ' 
OEPUlY CLEAK;t)PERioR COURT 
FULTON CaUN1V: GA . 
v. ) Civil Action File No. 2003-CV-65326 
) 
RIVERWOOD INTERNATIONAL ) 
CORPORA TION, RIVERWOOD ) 
INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY INC., ) 
And G. PHILIPS JONES ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On March 27, 2008, Counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 20,2004. After reviewing the record of the 
case, the briefs submitted on the motion, and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
I. Procedural and Factual Background 
Plaintiff served as a sales agentlbroker for Defendant Riverwood International Corporation 
("Riverwood"). Plaintiff placed Riverwood's machinery in third parties' bottling facilities pursuant to 
lease agreements, sold Riverwood's paperboard packaging products to these third parties, and 
performed customer service duties with each such account. In exchange, Plaintiff received 
commissions on a percentage of the paperboard packages sold. 
Plaintiff and Riverwood began working together in 1989 under a series of contracts ("Sales 
Agreements"). At times, however, a Sales Agreement would lapse and the parties would work 
together without a renewed agreement. For example, between 1997and 1999, Plaintiff and Riverwood 
continued their relationship without a formal agreement. At the end of 1999, however, Plaintiff and 
Riverwood executed a new agreement (the "2000 Agreement"). The 2000 Agreement provided for a 
reduced commission structure, but otherwise mirrored the earlier agreements between the parties in 
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tenns of payment structures, commissions, etc. During the course ofthe 2000 Agreement, Plaintiff 
secured multiple third party lease renewals and new contracts, as well as selling paperboard products. 
In 2002, upon the expiration of the 2000 Agreement, Defendant tenninated its business relationship 
with Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to commissions after the 2000 Agreement expired on all 
paperboard products sold for use with the equipment leases that Plaintiff secured for the remainder of 
the leases ("Continued Commissions"). To support its argument, Plaintiff points to the 2000 
Agreement and to the parties' prior course of dealing over the duration of their business relationship. 
After surviving a motion to dismiss and experiencing considerable delays in scheduling a 
motion for summary judgment, on petition of counsel, this case was transferred to the Business Court,. 
II. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the 
moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed 
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The moving party need only eliminate 
one essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary judgment. Real Estate In!'l Inc. v. 
Buggah, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996). 
III. Breach of Contract 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the 2000 Sales Agreement by failing to pay Continued 
Commissions. The language of the 2000 Agreement contains (i) a merger clause, (ii) an express 
prohibition of "additional compensation" for equipment leases, and (iii) language tying any 
commissions due under the contract to certain service obligations. In addition, Defendants point to the 
deposition testimony of Tom Irvin, Irvin's President, where he describes that the commissions due 
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under the 2000 Agreement (and previous Sales Agreements) were calculated based upon paperboard 
invoices, not equipment leases. "No additional compensation shall be paid for the sales or lease of 
machines," can only be interpreted as it reads. Thus, the language of the 2000 Agreement does not 
entitle Plaintiff to receive Continued Commissions. See Vulcan Materials Company v. Douglas, 131 
Ga. App. 21, 24 (1974) (holding that an equipment lease requiring a minimum product purchase did 
not "alone constitute a purchase order per se" entitling the plaintiff to post-termination commissions). 
Plaintiff also argues that (i) prior course of dealing, and/or (ii) irrevocable agency interest 
entitles it to Continued Commissions. 
Course of dealing is codified at a.c.G.A. § 11-1-205. Course of dealing, however, cannot 
conflict with an express written term. Plaintiff points to a billing dispute in 1995 over its right to 
receive Continuing Commissions on an account with an equipment lease after Plaintiff was removed 
from the account. Riverwood paid commissions on the account for several months, which it described 
as an "error", notified Plaintiff that the commissions would cease, and then agreed to pay 50% ofthe 
commission rate to Plaintiff as a compromise to continue the overall business relationship. 
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the payment of commissions on paperboard products between 
1997 and 1999 when it was operating without a Sales Agreement established a course of dealing which 
would entitle it to receive Continued Commissions after the expiration of a Sales Agreement. 
A single event, which occurred seven years before the facts which form the basis of Plaintiffs 
Complaint is insufficient to establish a course of dealing. Unique Designs, Inc. v. Pittard Machinery 
Co., 200 Ga. App. 647, 653 (1991) ("We can only conclude under the plain and unambiguous 
language ofthis statute that a sale of a single lathe from Pittard to Unique, which occurred more than 
two years prior to the transaction at issue in this action, cannot be deemed to be a sequence of previous 
conduct' under aCGA § 11-1-205(1)."). During, the 1997-1999 time period in which Plaintiff 
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received commissions without a Sales Agreement, Plaintiff continued to service those accounts by 
performing duties such as order placement, inventory forecasts, and complaint/dispute resolution. 
After the 2000 Agreement terminated, however, Plaintiff was excluded entirely from Riverwood's 
sales operations. Entitlement to receive Continuing Commissions would contlict with the express 
prohibition of "additional compensation" for equipment leases in the 2000 Sales Agreement. 
Irrevocable agency interest is codified at O.C.G.A. § 10-6-33. An irrevocable agency 
relationship is established when the agent has a direct interest in the rental contract, not just in the 
agency contract. See~, Adair v. Smith, 23 Ga. App. 290 (1919) (finding an irrevocable agency 
relationship where the plaintiff invested time and money in securing a tenant for the rental contract). 
Here, Plaintiff negotiated the contract with Riverwood for commissions on paperboard products in 
exchange for its services and sales (purchase orders and equipment leases), with an express prohibition 
of additional compensation related to the equipment leases. Plaintiff did not anticipate that the business 
relationship between it and Riverwood would terminate with the expiration of the 2000 Agreement; 
however, such knowledge now does not permit the Court to change the earlier, agreed-to terms of the 
contract. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Breach of Contract Claim is GRANTED. 
IV. Fraud 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint includes a claim for fraud alleging that Defendants induced it 
to enter into and perform under the 2000 Agreement with the intent to deprive it of commissions due 
under equipment leases. To recover on a fraud claim, Plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) a false 
representation of fact, (2) known by the speaker to be false at the time stated, (3) spoken with the intent 
to deceive the listener (i.e., scienter), (4) justifiable reliance by the listener upon the false statements, 
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and (5) damages proximately caused by the representations. Todd v. Martinez Paint & Body, Inc., 238 
Ga. App. 128, 128 (1999). 
Plaintiff cites an internal 1999 Riverwood memorandum regarding their future business 
relationship with Irvin to support Plaintiffs argument that Riverwood induced Irvin to act without a 
present intent of continuing the relationship (or paying commissions). In Equifax Inc. v. 1600 
Peachtree LLC, 268 Ga. App. 186 (2004), the Court of Appeals held that a present intent to breach a 
contract, by itself, is insufficient to establish fraud. The Court reasoned that even if Equifax had 
entered into the agreement with misleading representations and a plan to breach the contract, it would 
merely establish "hard-nosed business tactics or perhaps a divergent interpretation of the agreement, 
not fraud." Id. at 195. The Court of Appeals held that "Equifax was under no duty to disclose its own 
interpretation of its contractual obligations or the fact that it was contemplating asserting the defense of 
discharge." Id. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Fraud Claim is GRANTED. 
V. Remedies 
In conjunction with its Complaint, Plaintiff sought, as remedies, equitable estoppel, attorneys' 
fees, and punitive damages. In light ofthe Court's ruling, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on these claims is GRANTED. 
VI. Conclusion 
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